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INFORMATION PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY
Lauren Henry†

Legal academic and policy discourse generally presumes that
information privacy and data security are interchangeable goals. The
conventional wisdom is that data security is a handmaiden of
information privacy, and so what serves data security will serve
information privacy. However, this view is an oversimplification of the
relationship between the two fields. This Essay aids law and policy
development in both fields by correctly defining their relationship to
one another. Data security has separate objectives from information
privacy that can be agnostic or even in opposition to information
privacy. The law should acknowledge information privacy and data
security as separate institutional objectives to prevent undesirable—or
at least unpredictable—results in edge cases in which data security’s
objectives run counter to those of information privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
In legal academic writing and policy discussions alike,
information privacy and data security are typically handled together,
with the unexamined assumption that data security falls under the broad
heading of information privacy.1 The Federal Trade Commission
handles information privacy and data security cases in similar ways,
under the same grant of authority,2 and draws upon the same group of
experts for handling both types of cases.3 Derek Bambauer has observed
that there is widespread conflation in the existing legal literature
between information privacy and data security issues.4 By contrast, until
the past decade or so, industry had largely tackled data security and
information privacy separately.5 In fact, companies are still dismantling
the legacy practice of solving problems of information privacy and data
security through entirely separate corporate channels.6 Only within the
past decade or so have industry professionals begun to consciously
work to bring the distinct field of information privacy and data security

1 E.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1879, 1880 (2013) (“During the past decade, the problems involving information privacy—
the ascendance of Big Data and fusion centers, the tsunami of data security breaches, the rise of
Web 2.0, the growth of behavioral marketing, and the proliferation of tracking technologies—
have become thornier.” (emphasis added)); Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1637 (2013) (“To illustrate current state privacy laws, we can begin
with those state data security laws that impose a substantive requirement of ‘reasonable security’
before any data processing may occur.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98
CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1814–15 (2010) (citing data security breaches as an example of cases in
which financial injuries can be multiplied in the modern digital age).
2 See Daniel J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 610–19 (2014) (discussing data security-focused enforcement
actions alongside information-privacy enforcement in a discussion of the FTC’s use of its
authority in these areas); Lauren Henry, Note, Institutionally Appropriate Approaches to Privacy:
Striking a Balance Between Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Privacy Law, 51 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 193, 201–11 (2014) (discussing the FTC’s common approach to the information
privacy and data security matters it has addressed since the mid-1990s through analyzing all of
the major enforcement actions over that time period, with an emphasis on decoding how the
FTC’s approach has evolved).
3 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks Technologists for New Research,
Investigations Office (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/03/
ftc-seeks-technologists-new-research-investigations-office (“The OTRI will provide expert
research, investigative techniques and further insights to the agency on technology issues
involving all facets of the FTC’s consumer protection mission, including privacy, data security,
connected cars, smart homes, algorithmic transparency, emerging payment methods, big data, and
the Internet of Things.”).
4 See Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667
(2013).
5 E.g., Daniel Krege Christensen & Malcolm Harkins, Look, C-Suite, No Hands!
Communicating the Top 10 Privacy and Security Topics to Executives (Mar. 6, 2015), available
at
https://privacyassociation.org/media/presentations/15Summit/S15_Look_C_Suite_PPT.pdf.
The IAPP Global Privacy Summit is an annual conference that provides continuing education for
privacy professionals, as well as an important opportunity to network with others in the field.
6 Id.
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together to learn from one another.7
There are few works expressly dedicated to building a theory of
how information privacy and data security interrelate. A notable
exception to this is Derek Bambauer’s Privacy Versus Security, in
which Bambauer defines information privacy and data security and
stresses the importance of keeping the two separate at law.8 However,
Bambauer does not go far enough in distinguishing between information
privacy and data security. Bambauer defines data security as the
technology and institutional practices that implement the normative
decisions an institution has made about information privacy.9 While
Bambauer stresses the importance of keeping information privacy and
data security separate,10 he also defines the two fields in such a way that
data security’s objectives necessarily serve information privacy’s
objectives.
This Essay contends that data security has separate objectives
from information privacy that is agnostic or even in opposition to
information privacy. The law should acknowledge information privacy
and data security as separate institutional objectives to prevent
undesirable—or at least unpredictable—results in edge cases in which
data security’s objectives run counter to those of information privacy.
This Essay will proceed as follows. First, it will briefly define
information privacy and data security, and sketch their status in law and
industry. Second, it will examine reasons why scholars and lawyers
have struggled to keep them separate. Third, it will discuss how and
why information privacy and data security have often been handled
separately in practice. Fourth, it will discuss the characteristics of the
relationship between information privacy and data security and the
consequences of that relationship. Information privacy and data security
are linked from the perspectives of institutions that handle personal
information due to their shared relationship to databases that contain
personal information. However, an institution’s interest in its own data
security is not necessarily consonant with the information privacy
interests of the individuals whose personal information is housed.
Finally, the Essay concludes with some observations about the
implications of my analysis and the future research it suggests.
I.

DEFINITIONS

This section will broadly and briefly define both information
privacy and data security. The way in which information privacy and
7 Id.
8 Bambauer,
9 Id.
10 Id.

supra note 4.
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data security are defined and their significance is somewhat bifurcated.
As Kenneth Bamberger and Deidre Mulligan have noted in their
influential Stanford Law Review article, Privacy on the Books and on
the Ground, the actual contours of privacy at law and the definitions
used in industry are quite different.11
The predominant definition of information privacy in American
legal literature and existing statutory law defines information privacy as
the right to control one’s personal data.12 This puts a large amount of
emphasis on notice and consent. Privacy, from this point of view, has no
substantive content. It is an individual right to have control over data.
This point of view has been widely critiqued because it appears to give
undue legitimacy to clickwrap contracts and other forms of “consent”
that do not seem to reflect any actual understanding by individuals of
information usage by other actors.13 The sheer number and complexity
of privacy policies are impracticable for any person to read, and, even if
they did, cognitive biases tend to limit the average person’s ability to
rationally pursue their self-interest in the market for information
privacy.14 However, even where the power of notice, transparency, and
consent is questioned, many privacy advocates merely seek to replace
formal consent with a thicker, “meaningful” consent.15
11 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground,
63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 295 (2011) (“While the dominant account of U.S. privacy regulation—of
privacy ‘on the books’—correctly argues that U.S. law fails to provide the robust [Fair
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)] protections and comprehensive rule and enforcement
structures developed in Europe, the alternative account illuminates the concurrent entry of a new
force into the regulatory space—the FTC—and the way in which its activities, together with the
involvement of advocates, professionals, and market forces, helped frame a new discourse
regarding privacy protection.”).
12 E.g., Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L. J. 475, 482 (1968) (“Privacy is not simply an
absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over
information about ourselves.”). Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity approach is gaining
momentum as a counter approach in policy discussions. E.g., Michael Hoven, Balancing Privacy
and Speech in the Right to Be Forgotten, JOLT DIGEST (May 2, 2012),
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/privacy/balancing-privacy-and-speech-in-the-right-to-beforgotten (discussing the debate over the right to be forgotten using contextual integrity as the
working definition of the privacy interest); see generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010). Another
increasingly influential approach is Julie Cohen’s autonomy-based approach to information
privacy protection. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
As Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–36 (2000). Other historically significant approaches to
privacy include intimacy and the reasonable expectation approach adopted in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY INTIMACY AND ISOLATION (1992) (discussing privacy
as intimate); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (elaborating the reasonable expectation of
privacy test).
13 Solove, supra note 1, at 1880–82.
14 See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, 4 I/S J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 540 (2008) (empirical study showing the barriers,
both practical and psychological, to the average person meaningfully reading, understanding, and
responding rationally to privacy policies).
15 Solove, supra note 1, at 1881 (“With each sign of failure of privacy self-management,
however, the typical response by policymakers, scholars, and others is to call for more and
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By contrast, in industry and in the Federal Trade Commission’s
regulation thereof through enforcement actions, the predominant
approach to privacy is to construct a regime for using personal
information that comports with a conservative reading of social norms
surrounding information privacy. As Bamberger and Mulligan stated:
Each of the corporate privacy leaders . . . understood the meaning of
“privacy” to depend on the beliefs and assumptions of consumers as
to the appropriate treatment of individual information and personal
identity—expectations that evolve constantly and change by context.
The success of privacy protection, then, would be measured not by
the vindication of notice and consent rights, but in the actual
prevention of substantive harms, such as preventing data breaches, or
treating information in a way that protects the “trust” of those whose
information is at stake.16

In practice, companies have an understanding of information
privacy as a collective benefit for the community of users, as opposed to
an interest held by each individual user.17 Put another way, industry and
the FTC tend to weigh the privacy interests of the community against
the cost in terms of ensuring those privacy preferences are met, as
opposed to weighing the interest of an individual against innovation at
large, as industry and the FTC tend to do.18 There may be a collapse of
these two approaches, as recent scholarship has argued for a transfer of
the industry approach to privacy to legal understandings of privacy, but
as of the time of this writing, the difference between the definition of
privacy in policy and in industry practice remains. For the purposes of
this Essay, when I refer to “information privacy,” I mean a definition of
information privacy as combining the two: those series of policies with
respect to collected personal information that reflect an individual’s
liberty interest in deciding what to do with that information and social
norms regarding how personal information should be used, distributed,
and processed.19
improved privacy self-management.”). In many ways, the call for a form of consent outside of the
formal content of adhesion content harkens back to earlier discussions of contract law, in which
some argued that contracts of adhesion are and should be governed by different standards from
normal contracts. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1173, 1176 (1983) (“My broad conclusion is that, quite contrary to ‘ordinary’ contract
law, the form terms present in contracts of adhesion ought to be considered presumptively
(although not absolutely) unenforceable. . . . I try to show how this broad conclusion, and its more
detailed ramifications, can be transformed into at least the outline of new doctrine.”).
16 Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 11, at 251–52.
17 Id.
18 See Henry, supra note 2, at 194–98 (arguing that administrative agencies are well-suited to
balance one societal interest against another, in contrast to courts, which are designed for bipolar
disputes).
19 The author does not endorse this as the only proper definition of privacy, a theoretically
multifaceted concept. The literature attempting to define and classify privacy is vast. E.g., Jane
Yakowitz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 211–13 (2012); Daniel J.
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 484 (2006) (two recent taxonomies of
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The definition of data security understanding is similar in the law
literature, the case law, and in industry: it roughly means institutional
rules and technical methods that an institution uses to ensure that data is
only accessed by authorized people.20 In contrast to information
privacy, in which overwrought debates about the exact meaning of the
term can veil actual consensus on what problems privacy law should
solve,21 fewer scholars examine what is meant by data security and how
the law approaches its regulation.22 Many policymakers and scholars
assume that data security is a self-evident term. However, the supposed
simplicity of data security23 is a chimera, as this Essay’s discussion will
illustrate. Often the difficult ethical questions in data security are
shoehorned under the heading of information privacy. For example, the
moral obligation of credit card companies and retailers to take basic
steps to avoid breach is very often described as an information privacy
issue when it is clearly a data security issue.24
Having sketched the two major terms at stake, the Essay now
privacy at law and in society).
20 While this is the understood meaning, detailed definitions of data security are rare, despite
the prevalence of state data security laws. John Black, Developments in Data Security Breach
Liability, 69 BUS. LAW. 199, 206 (2013) (“Although several states have data security laws that
require businesses to adopt reasonable security measures to protect personal information, of
which the most notable and comprehensive may be Massachusetts Regulation 17, those statutes
do not define what constitutes reasonable data security.” (citations omitted)). One statute that
features a rigorous definition of data breach is found in California’s Security Breach Information
Act (SBIA). The SBIA defines a “breach of the security of the system” as “unauthorized
acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of
personal information.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d) (West 2015).
21 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008) (advocating for a “family
resemblances” approach to information privacy that would target policy making at solving the
assortment of social problems arising in the information privacy space); Lauren Henry, Levels of
Privacy Policy Analysis (May 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing
that privacy problems can be divided into four levels of analysis, and as long as there is consensus
on a lower, more practical level of analysis as to how to address a given problem, there is no need
to seek consensus on the higher, more theoretical levels; i.e., if there is broad social agreement
that individuals have a privacy interest in their home, there is no need to establish whether society
is grounding its approach to privacy under control, intimacy, contextual integrity, or any other
particular theoretical approach).
22 For an example of this uncommon, but important, type of work see generally David Thaw,
The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 287 (2014) (classifying,
describing, and evaluating approaches to regulating data security).
23 E.g., Bambauer, supra note 4, at 676 (Bambauer highlights the perception of data security
debates as a morally uncomplex area, while gesturing toward the normative debates hiding just
beneath the surface: “Security’s debates are more cold-blooded and technical—they are about
relative informational advantages, the ability to bear costs, and the magnitude and probability of
harm. Like precautions against civil harms (the domain of tort law), security measures exist along
a continuum. Perfection is generally unattainable or unaffordable. Where there are normative
choices—such as who should bear residual risk—they tend to be more deeply buried, or
subsumed in utilitarian methodologies.” (citations omitted)).
24 E.g., Kashmir Hill, Hackers Breaking Into Baby Cams Are Actually Trying to Help,
FUSION (Apr. 7, 2015), http://fusion.net/story/115649/hackers-breaking-into-baby-cams-areactually-trying-to-help (framing some baby camera companies’ refusal to provide security that is
now known to be hackable by anyone with an Internet connection as a morally reprehensible
refusal to provide data security at a level that any parent is entitled to expect).
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moves to discuss the major similarities and differences between the two
fields.
II.

INFORMATION PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY’S COMMONALITIES

As the previous section illustrates, information privacy and data
security can be conceptually distinguished. This section will discuss the
commonalities between the two fields by way of explaining the impulse
to conflate the two. Information privacy and data security speak to the
same databases, and concern trust and legitimacy issues from the
consumer perspective. More discussion and examples of these
commonalities follows.
First, similar facts are pertinent to both information privacy and
data security. The way in which actors collect, store, and distribute the
personal information they hold about others reflects those institutions
information privacy policies and their data security policies. An
increasing number of institutions that are voluntarily provided with
personal information are seeking ways to learn from and create income
from the information in their possession.25 Furthermore, other
companies are in the business of collecting or purchasing information
without the direct action of the consumer to form “digital dossiers”
about the characteristics of individuals.26
Second, actors’ incentive to give attention to both information
privacy and data security comes from trust and legitimacy concerns.
From the perspective of consumers, whether their personal information
is distributed with the consent of the institution housing it or not, if the
information ends up in a place that the consumer does not like, it
reflects poorly on that institution. Whether it is a matter of information
privacy or data security, from the perspective of the consumer,
increasing the vulnerability or distribution of information in a socially
unacceptable or “creepy”27 way erodes the trust they have in that
institution. The consumer’s pragmatic, consequentialist attitude toward
breaches of trust promotes the theoretical collapse of information

25 A Different Game: Information Is Transforming Traditional Businesses, The ECONOMIST
(Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15557465.
26 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002) (“In the Information Age, an increasing amount of personal
information is contained in records maintained by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), phone
companies, cable companies, merchants, bookstores, websites, hotels, landlords, employers, and
private sector entities. Many private sector entities are beginning to aggregate the information in
these records to create extensive digital dossiers.”).
27 See generally Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy
and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J. L. & TECH. 59, 61–71 (2013–2014) (defining and
characterizing innovations in data trafficking that consumers have found “creepy” and have led in
a pivot in institutional practice).
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privacy and data security.28 When either a privacy or data security
breach reflects a sharp deviation from social norms without anything
approximating constructive notice or consent, the legitimacy of the
institutions and the progress of technology are compromised.29 This
intuition is why several privacy scholars have proposed theories of
privacy invasion centered on a breach of confidence.30 Depending on
how the breach of confidence is defined, some information privacy and
data security transgressions could both be barred.31
III.

HOW INFORMATION PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY ARE SEPARATED
IN PRACTICE

Despite the overlaps discussed above, information privacy and data
security can be siloed into very different parts of professional practice.
The first section has already defined information privacy and data
security as distinct theoretical concepts.32 Information privacy is that
28 A confidentiality approach to information privacy and data security, which tends to
correspond to these consumer intuitions, has support in the common law and has been developed
by Woodrow Hartzog. See Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763,
767 (2014) (discussing implied confidentiality in the offline context and suggesting how that
doctrine could be applied to the digital context).
29 See Lauren Henry, Privacy Claims and Institutional Legitimacy, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (arguing that the reception and transparent disclosure of privacy complaints
regarding creepy features of modern technologies would help legitimize institutional leaders that
are modifying social practices, and give public and private actors concrete ideas for how to
minimize dead weight loss from socially detrimental aspects of innovation in the informationprivacy space).
30 See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283,
1312 (2000) (arguing for an approach to privacy at common law in tort based “loosely on the tort
doctrine of breach of confidence”); Lauren Henry, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (arguing for an approach to privacy at common law in tort based on the
quasi-property model; wherein a relationship of trust or wrongful act or act contrary to social
norms can permit the law to simulate property’s right to exclude, and thus torts in trespass and
misappropriation); Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION
(Mar. 5, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.html
(“The idea of an information fiduciary matters when the fiduciary discloses or uses sensitive
information about the beneficiary to the beneficiary’s disadvantage without permission.”).
31 Some have argued that intent is required for a duty to be violated, whereas the pure
incompetence or bad luck as the target of a very sophisticated hack normally associated data
security with could never rise to that level. See generally Bambauer, supra note 4. When one
looks into the details of certain data security matters, that position becomes untenable. However,
there is increasing evidence that some actors who traffic in data are willfully lax in how they store
their data in order to save money because of the asymmetry between the costs and the harms. It is
actually a moral question: how much effort is a holder of data obligated to take in order to attempt
to avoid data breaches?
32 Derek Bambauer has argued that there are benefits to a rigorous theoretical distinction
between information privacy and data security. Bambauer, supra note 4. His analysis uses
different definitions of information privacy and data security than this Essay, with the effect of
moving most of the easy cases into the data security category. Id. As he writes:

Privacy discourse involves difficult normative decisions about competing claims to
legitimate access to, use of, and alteration of information. It is about selecting among
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series of policies with respect to collected personal information that
reflect an individual’s liberty interest in deciding what to do with that
information and social norms regarding how personal information
should be used, distributed, and processed. Data security comprises of
the rules an institution selects and implements to ensure that only
authorized people access data. This section discusses the practical
reasons why the two fields remain separate, which include different
training for professionals, different institutional cultures around
developing policy, and different insurance against breaches.
First of all, information privacy and data security professionals
tend to have different training. A legal or policy background is
considered more pertinent for privacy, whereas information technology
or computer science training is perceived as more pertinent for data
security.33 This discrepancy is seen in the training necessary to obtain
information privacy certification, as opposed to data security
certification. The most common information privacy certification is the
Certification in Information Privacy Policy (CIPP), which is in law and
regulations, outstripping the Certification in Information Privacy
Technology (CIPT), among those who claim the certification on
LinkedIn, five fold.34 By contrast, the preponderance of certified people
and types of certification in Global Information Assurance Certification,
the leading data security certification body, are in technical spaces.35
Furthermore, the culture surrounding hacking clearly implicates data
security but rarely conceptualizes itself as having something to say
about information privacy.36 Different skills are perceived to be relevant
for individuals who work on information privacy versus data security,
although there is a trend toward encouraging the hiring and
development of technically skilled people in information privacy.37
different philosophies and choosing how various rights and entitlements ought to be
ordered. Security implements those choices—it mediates between information and
privacy sections. Importantly, [Bambauer’s] approach argues that security failings
should be penalized more readily, and more heavily, than privacy ones, because there
are no competing moral claims to resolve and because security flaw make all parties
worse off.
Id. at 683. My analysis, by contrast, proceeds from the observation that information privacy and
data security are procedures making distinct kinds of decisions. Both have philosophical and
practical elements, and force stakeholders to address easy and hard questions.
33 Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 11, at 262.
34 It may also be instructive to evaluate how common the credentials used by certified
persons are in public-facing forums, to gauge the industry value of the credential. On LinkedIn, as
of April 9, 2015, 6,596 profiles listed CIPP certification, compared to only 1,331 listing CIPT
certification. LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2015).
35 ABOUT: MISSION STATEMENT, GLOBAL INFORMATION ASSURANCE CERTIFICATION,
https://www.giac.org/about/mission (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
36 See, e.g., THE DEF CON STORY, DEF CON COMMC’NS, INC., https://defcon.org/html/
links/dc-about.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
37 Lorrie Faith Cranor, Wanted: Privacy Engineers, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF'LS,
https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/wanted-privacy-engineers (noting that organizations “are
looking for experts who can help them build privacy into their products from the ground up” but
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Information privacy issues are increasingly handled at the
executive level. Data security tends to be more of a departmental issue
and is as likely as not to be handled by consultants or contractors in
large companies. Privacy is considered to be a “strategic” issue, which
has led to a growing percentage of large companies with Chief Privacy
Officers.38 CPOs often handle data security at a strategic level, but as
the title suggests, the primary mission of such individuals and offices is
data privacy considerations.
The strategy that institutions pursue to prevent privacy invasion is
different from how they would prevent a data leak, at least on a granular
level. On a broad level, the same structure applies to both: the
institution devotes an amount of resources that it considers optimal to
hiring people to gauge and keep abreast of industry norms in the area
and best practices, and then it implements them. But since, in
information privacy, the goal is to avoid inappropriate collection,
processing, or distribution of information by the corporation itself, this
is executed by coding information collection, processing, and
distribution. By contrast, in data security, the objective is to keep data
collection channels and already-collected data as secure from
unauthorized access as possible.
While all of these three areas tend to show some signs of collapse
into one another, they reflect the ways in which information privacy and
data security differ in their implementation.
IV.

MAPPING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION PRIVACY
AND DATA SECURITY

Information privacy and data security are inexorably related
because the same underlying code and infrastructure are implicated in
both information privacy and data security.39 Information privacy and
data security are built upon the same premises with respect to technical
architecture. That is, both information privacy and data security speak
to setting the probabilities of use of a given database containing
personal information by particular parties and in particular ways.40
Since some types of increases in data security can shield personal
information from at least some offensive uses, the common
are uncertain about where to find such professionals).
38 Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 11, at 261–63.
39 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, 7–8 (2006) (elaborating a theory
underscoring the centrality of coded infrastructure in determining the possibilities in law and
policy). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy (Apr. 3, 1998) (unpublished
draft), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/works/lessig/architecture_priv.pdf.
40 Both information privacy and data security are often ex post additions to information
processing systems with other goals entirely. See, e.g., In the Matter of Twitter, Inc., FTC File
No. 092-3093 (Mar. 2, 2011) (illustrating the difficulties Twitter faced when it integrated security
into the software development life cycle relatively late, as an afterthought).
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misapprehension is that more data security serves both the company and
the information privacy of the individuals whose personal information is
in a database,41 at least up to a certain point.42 This is untrue. As this
section will illustrate, data security can be a shield against information
privacy protection.
One example of how the clash between information privacy and
data security might play out in practice is a hypothetical based on the
facts of the Google Buzz FTC matter.43 Google Buzz was a social
network that Google produced by reorganizing and making public
information about Gmail users in order to form social media public
profiles.44 The idea was to create a ready-made social network.45
However, the FTC alleged that the creation of Google Buzz was unfair
or deceptive because Google utilized customers’ information provided
for Gmail for social networking purposes in violation of the company’s
privacy policies.46 This matter was ultimately settled, with Google
admitting no culpability, but agreeing to take on an unprecedented,
multi-decade comprehensive privacy program subject to periodic
external audit.47
However, in a more formal legal battle, an institution that traffics
in data could have taken another tack. In a forum that accepts that data
security’s goals serve information privacy, the hypothetical institution
might argue that it could not be compelled to disclose or change the
algorithms it uses with respect to information privacy or data security.
This is because disclosure of that information, or even public disclosure
of a broad outline of the processes employed, could put the private
information in the database at elevated risk of data breach. So, to make
this concrete through reference to the facts of Google Buzz, a
hypothetical institution under analogous facts might contend that they
could not disclose the process by which they mined the information
from the dossiers they had on each user and reframed it as a social
media page because such disclosure would put the data security of the
database at risk. However, this authentic data security concern would be
at odds with the ability of a regulator to seek to enforce the information
privacy interests of those individuals whose information is in the
41 E.g., Bambauer, supra note 4, at 681 (“Thus, security failures generally leave everyone
involved (except the attacker) worse off. Privacy failures, by contrast, typically involve a transfer
of utility between parties . . . .”)
42 As the example of the baby cameras illustrates, in an extreme case, some companies will
only see fit to have data security up until a certain point, after which it is no longer worth it for
them. See Hill, supra note 24.
43 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Googles
[sic] Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network (Mar. 30, 2011), available at https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-charges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-rollout-its-buzz.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
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database against the institution that operates the database.
In a future in which transparency may be the most powerful
weapon information privacy advocates have against abuses,48 data
security looms as a method for limiting the ability of information to
come out to correct undesirable information privacy practices. Far from
being a marginal, hypothetical case, situations where data security may
conflict with information privacy should be a major area of study for
scholars, policymakers, and stakeholders.
CONCLUSION
This Essay provides a roadmap on how to think about information
privacy and data security’s relationship to one another. It is axiomatic
that information privacy alters the assumptions and premises upon
which data security operates, and vice versa. While the problems can be
separated, an awareness of their impact on one another is mandatory for
best practices.
There is a large and growing professional culture cropping up
around consumer demands for both information privacy and data
security. As the issues become increasingly complicated and
specialized, a way to understand how they relate to each other becomes
increasingly important. Rather than being surprised about how changes
in the code and procedure of data security influence information
privacy, and vice versa, corporations and policymakers should be
looking ahead to how changes to the one might impact the other.
The demands and objectives of data security and information
privacy are not identical, and legal approaches that presume institutions’
data security interest necessarily serves the public’s interest in
information privacy with respect to their personal information are thus
doomed to run into serious problems. Therefore, it will not do to assume
normative problems in data security are sufficiently addressed by work
on information privacy.

48 See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY:
TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998) (arguing

WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US
that some degree of privacy can
be protected even in a society with pervasive surveillance through pervasive transparency).

